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foRewoRD
To produce, trade on or use agricultural products as fuel—a practice as old as human history—
has become a policy riddle spawning emotional debate and multiple, sometimes competing and 
conflicting, measures and actions. Today, many see fuel derivatives from agricultural produce and 
forests as a new frontier in energy supply. In a context of action against climate change, the carbon 
emissions efficiency of some energy crops has emerged as a promising, powerful alternative to 
the use of fossil fuels. Against a backdrop of energy scarcity, particularly in cash-dry economies, 
excitement on the prospect of producing cheap fuels from un-edible crops at large scale seems 
unarguable. Especially if crops are grown on marginal lands, if new policies both at home and 
abroad are generating fresh capital and investment flows, and if, on top, energy resulting may 
match otherwise unattended demand and neglected populations.
A promissory outlook, except that at this very time, successfully steering action on agrofuels as 
a tactic in combating climate change, or as energy or developmental strategy, is complicated by 
critical factors; primarily, a lack of consensus on how to deal with the emerging flows of trade 
and investment and the ensuing trade-offs in the allocation of implicated resources, from land, to 
work force, to capital. Compounding the issue are ill-equipped existing regulatory frameworks at 
both domestic and international levels. And, equally crippling is perceived deficiency in science 
and metrics to demonstrate effects. Not insignificant is the realization that current technologies 
limitations of scale render the whole idea less attractive or, at best, relegate its relevance to a 
niche use.
Yet, OECD countries and most major demandeurs of energy for transport or otherwise, have in the 
past few years adopted policies and measures that have spurred enormous demand and stimulated 
investment in production and growth. Evidence shows that these policies have created or significantly 
and rapidly expanded trade flows and production at home and abroad; in particular measures 
introducing mandates of agrofuel use in the mix of liquid fuel for transportation or the energy grid. 
Activity on technological development has also surged in recent years in response to prospects and 
stimuli; indeed, high expectation of an eventual technological fix to the shortcomings of existing 
possibilities for ethanol and bio-diesel, specifically in the use of biotechnology in the conversion 
of cellulose fibres into energy, has served in contradictory ways as both incentive or deterrent for 
further development of existing feedstock. The fact is that given that energy crops are based on the 
basic conversion of sunlight into energy by means of plants, natural comparative advantages rest 
for the moment in tropical crops; a key factor determining the current geography of production and 
trade. However, technological applications at advanced stages of development may soon alter all 
this and with it, the accompanying political economy orbiting policy-making.
Net gains and losses from use of biomass as energy are hard to estimate, particularly in a long-term 
assessment. Odds for a future of improved energy efficiency, lower carbon emissions, reasonable and 
sustainable use of lands for the production of food, fibre, forests or fuel, and larger developmental 
and social gains, may be enhanced or doomed by options on policy made now; especially those 
aiming at long term targets and changes and regulatory frameworks in the form of international 
rules that limit and lock-in our possibilities.
It is in this context that ICTSD has decided in the past two years to engage in policy dialogue, 
research and analysis and problem-solving activity that contribute to societies’ very pressing and 
real need to come to grips with the reality of energy crops. We do so, conscious of the dynamism 
of the policy environment, together with the intended and unintended consequences of policy 
viii Alan Swinbank  —   EU Support for Biofuels and Bioenergy, Environmental Sustainability   




development; the actual impact of decisions on use of resources in the daily lives of communities 
and individuals, even if on trial or temporarily terms, and the need to find solutions from the policy 
perspective that are durable and supportive of the sustainable aspirations of societies and global 
welfare.
The issue paper you are holding, authored by Alan Swinbank, provides policy-relevant analysis of EU 
policies driving biofuels production within and outside the EU and their implications for trade policy. 
It is part of ICTSD’s project on Promoting Sustainable Bioenergy Production and Trade, published 
under its Programme on Agricultural Trade and Sustainable Development, which seeks to promote 
food security, equity and environmental sustainability in agricultural trade.
This paper incorporates material previously presented at Agra Informa’s biannual seminar on the 
common agricultural policy (CAP), and assembled for a research project on Integrated systems 
for farm diversification into energy production by anaerobic digestion: implications for rural 
development, land use and the environment funded by the UK Research Councils under the Rural 
Economy and Land Use (Relu) programme, involving colleagues in the Centre for Agricultural Strategy 
at the University of Reading, and at the University of Southampton. Alan Swinbank is grateful to 
the Economic and Social Research Council for funding, and to his colleagues in Southampton and 
Reading for their forbearance in the recycling of material here. The report was written in parallel 
with a Presidential Address for the Agricultural Economics Society, entitled EU Policies on Bioenergy 
and their Potential Clash with the WTO, for presentation at the Society’s annual conference in 
Dublin in spring 2009. 
Although we asked specifically for a report on biofuels, it is important to set this in the more general 
context of EU policy on bioenergy, and this paper does so. The EU is seeking to lay down mandatory 
targets for the use of renewable energy and biofuels, but it is largely the responsibility of the 
Member States to deliver on these. They are using a variety of policy mechanisms and incentives; 
and as it would be a major undertaking to detail the policies of all 27 Member States this report 
focuses on the United Kingdom.
The paper does not attempt to disentangle the science behind the policy response, the technologies 
deployed, or the economics of bioenergy production.
The ICTSD teams involved in these fascinating issues and myself, very much hope that this paper is 
of interest and, indeed, a contribution to the current debate and the definition of policy options.
Thank you,
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eXeCutIVe suMMARY
Although undoubtedly influenced by concerns about security of energy supplies, and a wish to 
find alternative market outlets for European farmers, the EU’s policy for biofuels (defined in EU 
legislation as liquid and gaseous fuels for transport use) is associated closely with its more generic 
policies to promote bioenergy, which in legislative terms is embedded in its policy on renewable 
energy, part of its strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The EU’s strategy, and its implementation by the Member States, has been evolving for a number 
of years; but its current ambition is that by 2020 some 20 percent of its primary energy supplies 
should come from renewable resources (including bioenergy) and that, in each Member State, 
renewables (largely biofuels) should provide 10 percent of energy use for transport. It is up to the 
Member States to deliver on these obligations, in the framework of EU rules.
In the UK, for example, which will be required to source 15 percent of its primary energy from re-
newables by 2020, there is a renewables obligation (RO) imposed on electricity suppliers. Failure to 
meet the obligation results in a financial penalty; it is this RO that is providing farmers with finan-
cial incentives to plant Miscanthus and other material suitable for burning in electricity-generating 
power stations.
For transport, biofuels in the UK pay a reduced road fuel tax, and a renewable transport fuel 
obligation (RTFO) obligates suppliers of petrol and diesel to incorporate set percentages of biofuels 
in their aggregate supplies. Throughout Europe, biodiesel is a much more important biofuel than is 
bioethanol.
Various investment grants are also available to further encourage the uptake of these new tech-
nologies. The EU’s rural development regulation, part of its CAP, provides for various forms of on-
farm and rural investment. Other CAP provisions are rather irrelevant, as the limited Energy Crops 
Scheme was abolished in the Health Check reforms agreed in November 2008.
Imports of bioethanol face a high import tariff, but most bioethanol is imported at a zero rate from 
developing countries through super-GSP (Generalized System of Preferences), Everything but Arms 
and (what was) the Cotonou Convention. Apart from imports of biodiesel from the United States of 
America (USA) (a contested trade), imports of vegetable oils supply the biodiesel market. Because 
the EU offers financial incentives to use biofuels that are not matched by similar incentives in 
supplier countries, the EU’s imports of biofuels (and of vegetable oils for blending as biodiesel) are 
probably larger than they would otherwise be.
The UK’s policies to support the use of biofuels would not appear to be problematic under the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the SCM Agreement). 
They would not appear to be prohibited subsidies, because they are not paid on exports but they are 
paid on imports. Nor would they appear to be actionable: the alleged “harm” they impose on other 
countries is to raise world food commodity prices (not an issue addressed by the SCM Agreement) 
rather than cause harm to overseas suppliers. Under the Agreement on Agriculture, they potentially 
would be declarable as amber box policies, but the impact would be slight. Biodiesel is not covered 
by this agreement; there is no market price support within the meaning of the agreement; and 
the financial benefit conferred on suppliers of material for bioethanol production is limited (and 
difficult to determine). However, if the EU were to declare all of its taxpayer- and consumer-funded 
biofuel subsidies as amber box support, then this would form a substantial proportion of its aggregate 
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measurement of support (AMS) entitlement, which would be problematic following a successful 
outcome to the Doha Round.
The real problem in the WTO is the EU’s plan to impose environmental sustainability criteria on biofuels if 
they are to contribute to renewables mandates and benefit from EU support programmes.
The EU’s plans for environmental sustainability criteria could be challenged in the WTO, and they will be 
defended successfully only if the EU can show that they are non-discriminatory and scientifically based and 
that they have been imposed only after meaningful negotiations, with the EU’s main suppliers, to develop 
international standards.
1ICTSD Programme on Agricultural Trade and Sustainable Development
1. IntRoDuCtIon
As elsewhere, the motives driving the EU’s use 
of, and policy towards, biofuels (and bioenergy 
more generally) are complex and multifaceted. 
Concerns about the price of energy derived 
from fossil fuels has some part to play in the 
commercial interest shown in bioenergy, but oil 
prices alone are not really sufficient to drive 
commercial operators to invest heavily in new 
bioenergy installations. The European industry 
exists mainly because of policy incentives.
The two explicit policy drivers are (i) a concern 
about energy security, which has been to the 
fore in the US, and (ii) as part of an effort 
to reduce carbon emissions to combat global 
warming, which has tended to dominate the 
European initiatives. There is also, undoubtedly, 
an agricultural or rural development interest: 
if an additional outlet for farm products can 
be found, then this could boost farm incomes, 
generate new jobs in rural areas, and reduce 
the dependence of the agricultural sector on 
the existing policy mechanisms under the CAP.
European environmental legislation limiting, 
for example, the use of landfill for waste 
disposal and the release of animal slurries in 
nitrate-sensitive areas, can also encourage the 
production of bioenergy (particularly biogas). 
Because of the restrictions on landfill, local 
governments, businesses and others producing 
“waste” biomass (e.g. from households and 
food-processing plants) are now willing to pay 
a “gate fee” to dispose of waste to operators, 
who will then use it to generate power or 
produce biogas.
There is a vast array of technologies and 
products, but for our discussion of EU policy on 
bioenergy we consider three main types:
• “Woody” material, burnt in dedicated boil-
ers for the generation of heat (e.g. on 
farms) or electricity (possibly co-fired with 
a fossil fuel), or more advantageously in a 
combined heat and power (CHP) plant. It 
might be crop and food-industry wastes 
(e.g. straw, chaff or the bagasse of sugar-
cane production), or crops grown specifical-
ly for the purpose (e.g. coppiced willow or 
the grass Miscanthus). Forestry trimmings, 
household waste, etc. add to the list of ma-
terial that can be burnt. Vegetable oils are 
also used to produce electricity; for exam-
ple, in March 2008 it was announced that 
the Dutch group BioX was installing a power 
station to be fuelled by palm oil or other 
vegetable oils and fats at the Noord Natie 
terminal of Antwerp harbour.1
• Biofuels for use in combustion engines for 
transport. The main products to date are 
biodiesel, and bioethanol as a substitute 
for petrol. In Sweden and several other 
Member States, biogas (see below) is an 
important biofuel. Biodiesel and bioethanol 
can be incorporated at low concentrations 
to be used in existing diesel and petrol 
engines (making use of the existing supply 
networks), or used in dedicated engines 
requiring a dedicated fuel supply system.2 
The industry talks about first- and second-
generation technologies. Put simply, first-
generation technologies take vegetable oils 
(or used cooking fats) and turn them into 
biodiesel and, through fermentation and 
distillation, produce bioethanol from crops 
such as maize, sugar and wine-grapes. 
Second-generation technologies promise, 
but are not yet really delivering, a range of 
liquid fuels produced from the whole plant, 
and not only its edible crop, for example 
biomass liquefaction via pyrolysis.3
• Biogas, produced from anaerobic digestion 
of animal wastes, food wastes and dedicated 
crops, in either on-farm or industrial-style 
digesters, can be used for heat and electric-
ity generation and to power vehicles. It has 
the added advantage that it can capture the 
1.1 the products and technologies
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methane (another greenhouse gas) that would 
otherwise be released from animal slurry, etc.4 
Similarly, the methane released from landfill 
waste disposal sites can be captured as biogas. 
Anaerobic digestion of animal slurries is often 
seen as an environmentally friendly means of 
waste disposal, particularly in areas of inten-
sive livestock production.
Despite the apparent benefits of bioenergy and 
biofuels, there is a growing chorus of dissent 
suggesting that the carbon savings might 
be less than popularly imagined, that other 
environmental effects could be adverse, and that 
bioenergy policies in particular helped to fuel 
the food commodity price spikes experienced 
in 2008. We do not attempt an assessment of 
the arguments for and against bioenergy in 
this report, but it is important to note that the 
issue is highly political and that policies are 
subject to change. Thus, in May 2008, in the 
midst of the 2008 world food “crisis”, the UK’s 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, in an open letter 
to his colleagues on ECOFIN, the EU’s Economic 
and Financial Affairs grouping of the Council 
of Ministers, suggested inter alia that the EU 
needed to undertake a “close examination of 
the direct and indirect effects of EU biofuels 
policy, including a full assessment of its effect 
on food prices, now and in future” (Darling, 
2008). Both within the Member States and within 
the EU’s institutions, particularly the European 
Parliament, bioenergy, and particularly biofuel, 
policy is being questioned.
It is rather tempting, for example, to imagine 
that the carbon footprint of bioenergy production 
from crops is neutral: carbon is captured in the 
plant and then released on use. However, the 
reality can be more complex. If the farmer uses 
fossil fuels to plant and harvest the crop, and 
if fossil fuels are used to process and distribute 
the biofuel, then the carbon savings can be 
slight; indeed, in some instances, there might 
be no net savings at all. Where and how the 
crop is grown can also be important, although 
identifying an appropriate counterfactual for a 
benchmark is not easy. But carbon can all too 
easily be released from carbon sinks, be they 
forests, wetlands, etc., and increased amounts 
of nitrous oxide, another greenhouse gas, can 
be released into the atmosphere. Consequently, 
there is an increased interest in trying to 
establish certification schemes to vouch for 
the claims of greenhouse gas savings associated 
with particular bioenergy fuels.
It is believed that if bioenergy crops are 
encouraged, then less land will be available for 
growing food, and world food prices will increase; 
indeed, quite large areas of land would have to 
be devoted to bioenergy crops in order to make 
a sizeable contribution to the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions. The issue is particularly 
emotive when food crops are used as feedstocks. 
Consequently, some politicians and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) have labelled 
the push for biofuels immoral: for instance, in 
January 2007 the issue was raised by the Swedish 
farm minister (Agra Europe, 2007a: N/4), and in 
May 2006 the then Danish minister for transport 
and energy expressed his ethical opposition to 
first-generation technologies producing biofuel 
from food crops (Agra Europe, 2006a: N/1). 
But the pricing effects can be complex. If more 
oilseeds are grown to extract oil for biodiesel, 
for example, then more protein-rich oilseed meal 
will be produced, which could be advantageous 
for intensive-livestock producers.
Oxfam International (2007), referring specifically 
to the EU’s biofuel target (outlined in Chapter 2), 
has suggested that not only might this have an ad-
verse effect on food prices, impacting particularly 
on the world’s poor, but also that in the rush to 
develop plantation-scale production of biofuels 
in the developing world, the rights of smallhold-
ers and indigenous peoples might be jeopardized, 
leading Oxfam International to suggest that: “In 
addition to environmental standards, the EU must 
develop social standards which apply to all biofu-
els irrespective of their origin” (ibid.: 6).
1.2 wider policy concerns
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If more land is brought into production as a 
result of the push to produce more bioenergy 
crops, then not only might this release car-
bon into the atmosphere from tropical rain-
forests, etc., but also the habitat loss might 
be severe. Thus, some environmentalists have 
linked the fate of the orang-utan and its rain-
forest homes in South-East Asia to the ex-
pansion of palm-oil plantations for biodiesel 
(Murdoch, 2007).
This document continues with, first, an overview 
of EU policy on renewable energy and biofuels, 
including its planned sustainability criteria for 
biofuels. The following chapter outlines the UK’s 
policies to implement the mandatory targets, al-
though it must be conceded that the UK is not 
necessarily a typical Member State.
The next chapter outlines those aspects of the CAP 
that encourage biomass production for bioenergy 
and biofuel use within the EU. The report then de-
tails the EU’s trade policy on biofuels, including its 
preferential trade arrangements, and the poten-
tial for EU anti-dumping measures against biodie-
sel from the USA. To the extent possible, it identi-
fies the EU’s imports of biofuels; but hard data on 
trade volumes are difficult to establish.
The penultimate chapter discusses three further 
issues that relate to the WTO: first, support for 
biofuel and its compatibility with WTO provi-
sions; second (but briefly), technical standards 
and international standardisation; and third, en-
vironmental sustainability criteria.
1.3 structure of the remainder of the report
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There is a complex array of policies in place to 
encourage the production and use of bioenergy 
in Europe. At the EU level, various CAP measures 
have encouraged production of suitable crops, 
which we outline in Chapter 4. Import tariffs 
are in place (see Chapter 5). Stemming from its 
international commitments on carbon emission 
reductions, the EU has agreed that it will adopt 
binding reduction commitments. An embryonic 
carbon-emissions trading scheme is in place. 
Member States are trying to achieve their 
reduction commitments through a variety of 
schemes. In the UK this includes the Bioenergy 
Capital Grants Scheme, supporting biomass 
projects for heat and CHP, renewable fuel 
obligations, and tax concessions on biofuels for 
transport.5 In this chapter we set out the EU’s 
policy framework for renewable energy, and in 
Chapter 3 we show how these obligations are 
being implemented in the UK.
2. the eu PoLICY fRAMewoRk
EU policy on renewable energy and biofuels has 
been evolving for some time. Some Member States 
had been pursing renewable energy strategies in 
advance of EU initiatives. In 1997, for example, a 
Commission White Paper, Energy for the Future 
– Renewable Sources of Energy, suggested a 
doubling of the renewable energy contribution, to 
12 percent of “gross inland consumption by 2010” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1997; 
cited in Commission of the European Communities, 
2007a: 4).
EU transport is responsible for about 21 percent 
of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions, and ris-
ing (Commission of the European Communities, 
2006a: 3). In 2003, in its Biofuels Directive, the 
EU established an indicative target for member 
states: that by the end of 2010, biofuels should 
account for 5.75 percent “of all petrol and die-
sel for transport purposes”, calculated on the 
basis of energy content.6 As an indicative target, 
this initiative had little impact on the policy re-
sponse of some Member States, and it was clear 
that the target was unlikely to be met unless new 
initiatives were taken. In 2005, for example, the 
EU-wide share was 1 percent, with Germany ac-
counting for two-thirds of this (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2007a: 7). The in-
dicative targets set in 2001 for renewable elec-
tricity generation7 were much closer to being 
met, but some Member States were lagging be-
hind and the Commission had “initiated infringe-
ment proceedings against six Member States for 
not fulfilling their obligations” (ibid.).
Accordingly, in its 2007 communication Renew-
able Energy Road Map. Renewable Energies in 
the 21st Century: Building A More Sustainable 
Future, the Commission suggested, inter alia, “a 
mandatory (legally binding) target of 20 percent 
for renewable energy’s share of energy consump-
tion in the EU by 2020” (Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, 2007a: 3) and that “The min-
imum target for biofuels for 2020 should, on the 
basis of conservative assumptions, related to the 
availability of sustainably produced feedstocks, 
car engine and biofuel-production technologies, 
be fixed at 10 percent of overall consumption of 
petrol and diesel in transport” (ibid.: 10).
On this basis, the European Council (i.e. the 
meeting of EU heads of state or government) in 
March 2007 endorsed an integrated climate and 
energy policy that included:
• a commitment to cut greenhouse gas emis-
sions by 20 percent (compared with a 1990 
base) by 2020, and by 30 percent if other 
countries followed suit; although how this 
would be shared among the Member States 
was still to be determined; 
• a mandatory target that 20 percent of EU 
energy supplies should come from renew-
able sources by 2020 (excluding nuclear 
power). Again, how this 20 percent percent 
would be shared among the Member States 
was to be determined;
2.1 the renewable energy roadmap
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• a mandatory minimum 10 percent blend of 
biofuels to be used by all Member States in 
“transport petrol and diesel” by 2020;
• to review the EU’s Emissions Trading 
Scheme and “and to consider ... a possible 
extension of its scope to land use, land-use 
change and forestry and surface transport” 
(Council of the European Union, 2007).
It is important to emphasize that the first 
three points would be binding commitments 
on the Member States, although the penalty 
they would face if they failed to deliver on the 
commitment was unclear. The EU would set the 
overall framework and adopt some facilitating 
measures (e.g. changes to the Fuel Quality 
Directive), but within this framework it would 
be up to the Member States to decide how to 
meet the targets. It is impractical in this report 
to discuss all the measures being pursued by 
27 Member States; accordingly, in Chapter 3 we 
focus on implementation in the UK.
The March 2007 agreement of the European 
Council was translated into a draft Directive 
that the Commission presented to the Council 
and European Parliament in January 2008 
(Commission of the European Communities, 
2008a). As well as specifying the proposed 
mandatory targets for renewables by Member 
State for 2020, and other details, the proposal 
also referred to a 10 percent renewables share 
of energy in transport by 2020 (rather than a 
10 percent biofuels share in transport petrol 
and diesel, in the March 2007 agreement of the 
European Council), and it contained proposed 
“Environmental Sustainability” criteria for 
biofuels and bioliquids.8 These Environmental 
Sustainability criteria would have to be met if 
the biofuel (or bioliquid) was to count (i) against 
the Member State’s mandatory targets, (ii) for 
any renewable energy obligation imposed on 
business and (iii) for any subsidy payment. They 
are outlined more fully below.
These proposals then had to be deliberated upon 
by the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament, before a joint decision of these 
two institutions could be reached, in a process 
known as co-decision. The rapporteur of the 
European Parliament’s Committee on Industry, 
Research and Energy produced a draft report 
in May 2008 (European Parliament, 2008a) 
that was largely endorsed by the committee in 
September (European Parliament, 2008b; Agra 
Europe, 2008a: EP/1) for debate at the European 
Parliament’s plenary session in December. The 
industry committee’s text would have inserted 
more stringent sustainability criteria for biofuels 
than had been proposed by the Commission; 
but after intense tripartite discussions between 
the Parliament, Council and Commission these 
were largely dropped, and on 17 December 2008 
the European Parliament adopted the Climate 
Change Package (European Parliament, 2008c).
This has six components:
• revisions to the EU’s Emissions Trading 
Scheme;
• an “effort-sharing” decision on Member 
State targets for an overall 10 percent 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 
sectors of the economy not covered by the 
Emissions Trading Scheme;
• revisions to the Fuel Quality directive;
• a regulation on CO2 emissions from cars, 
under which car companies will face 
financial penalties if the CO2 emissions from 
their new cars exceed specified limits;
• a legal framework to provide for carbon 
capture and storage;
• the first reading of the new Directive on 
the Promotion of the Use of Energy from 
Renewable Sources (European Parliament, 
2008d).
The Directive on the Promotion of the Use of 
Energy from Renewable Sources
Following its first reading in the European Parlia-
ment, as reported above, the Directive was adopt-
ed by the Council in April 2009 and will be imple-
mented in 2010 (Council of the European Union, 
2009). It is of course a long and complex directive, 
with a number of let-outs, but for present purpos-
es we emphasize three important elements.
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The Directive sets out, for each Member State, 
the share that “energy from renewable resourc-
es” must achieve in “gross final consumption of 
energy in 2020”. The numbers follow shortly. 
These “mandatory national targets”, we are 
told, “are consistent with a target of at least 
a 20 percent share of energy from renewable 
sources in the Community’s gross final energy 
consumption in 2020” (European Parliament, 
2008d: Article 3). Transfers between the Member 
States are allowed, but there appear to be no 
sanctions in place to discipline a Member State 
that fails to achieve its mandatory target.
The requirement that each Member State 
ensures that the share of energy from renewable 
sources in all forms of transport in 2020 is at 
least 10 percent of final consumption of energy 
in transport in that Member State is maintained, 
despite attempts by the industry committee 
of the European Parliament to tighten the 
rules. The expectation is that first-generation 
biofuels will be used, in the main, to meet this 
obligation. The industry committee had wanted 
40 percent of this 10 percent to be supplied 
by second-generation biofuels or electricity 
from renewables (European Parliament, 2008c: 
11). The compromise agreed will give a double 
weighting of 2 to second-generation biofuels, in 
meeting the 10 percent target, and renewable 
electricity used in road transport (but not rail) 
will have a weighting of 2.5.
Third, Article 17 of the Directive sets out various 
“sustainability” criteria.
Sustainability criteria
The European Parliament’s Committee on In-
dustry, Research and Energy took the lead in 
progressing the Commission’s proposed direc-
tive on renewable energy through Parliament, 
with Claude Turmes, a member of the Green 
Party, as its rapporteur. This committee took a 
particularly strong stance on sustainability cri-
teria. As a result, the directive that emerged 
from the first reading of the European Parlia-
ment in plenary session in December 2008 (Eu-
ropean Parliament, 2008d) lays down stricter 
criteria than the Commission had originally pro-
posed in January 2008 (Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, 2008a), but, following the 
consultation procedure with the Council, it was 
toned down considerably from the text adopted 
by the committee in September (European Par-
liament, 2008b). Table 1 summarizes the key 
differences between these three documents.
The proposed text of the committee would have 
applied to all biomass for energy purposes, with 
more stringent criteria for biofuels for transport, 
whereas the Commission’s proposal, and the 
first-reading text, apply in the first instance to 
biofuels and bioliquids, with the possibility of 
an extension, fairly quickly, to other biomass.
Under the Commission’s proposal, biofuels had 
to show a greenhouse gas emissions saving of at 
least 35 percent (for plants already in operation 
in January 2008, this would apply from 2013). 
The industry committee wanted this to be 45 
percent, rising to 60 percent from January 2015. 
The agreed text reverts to the Commission’s 35 
percent proposal at the outset but then jumps 
to 50 percent from 2017, with new plants having 
to show a 60 percent saving from that date. This 
could lead to segmentation in the supply chain, 
between implementation and 2013, and after 
2017, with older facilities accepting feedstock 
with lower greenhouse gas emission savings. The 
Commission’s proposal (and the text as adopted), 
in applying to both biofuels and bioliquids, 
would have prevented diversion of product from 
transport to other uses, but paradoxically the 
industry committee’s proposed text would not.
The agreed text has two additional require-
ments, broadly reflecting the Commission’s pro-
posal that (i) the land on which the crops are 
grown must not have had a high biodiversity 
value in January 2008 (e.g. designated areas 
for nature protection, virgin forest, species-rich 
grassland); and (ii) the land on which the crops 
are grown must not have had a high carbon stock 
in January 2008 (e.g. wetlands, continuously 
forested areas). All these criteria apply to im-
ported as well as EU-produced biofuels, with the 
potential for WTO concerns, which we discuss in 
Chapter 6. In the WTO there has been a reluc-
tance to allow discrimination between products 
based upon production methods.
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The European Parliament’s Committee on In-
dustry, Research and Energy had wanted to go 
much further. They would have added a new 
“food policy” constraint – that “The use of 
land for the production of biofuels shall not be 
allowed to compete with the use of land for 
the production of foods” – and new conditions 
relating to labour rights (European Parliament, 
2008b: amendments 83, 148–153). Whether 
these proposed conditions were workable 
(e.g. the proposed food policy constraint) or 
defendable in the WTO was hotly debated in 
Europe, and they were dropped from the final 
text. However, the Commission is now commit-
ted to producing a biennial report on social 
sustainability, the impact on “the availability 
of foodstuffs at affordable prices” and “land 
use rights”.
Commission Proposal, 
January 2008: Article 15
Report of the Industry 
Committee, September 
2008, Article 15
After the European 
Parliament’s first reading, 
December 2008: Article 17
Title: Environmental 
sustainability criteria for 
biofuels and other bioliquids
Title: Sustainability criteria 
for biomass for energy
Title: Sustainability criteria for 
biofuels and other bioliquids
Greenhouse gas emission 
savings of at least 35 percent 
(deferred until April 2013 for 
installations in operation in 
January 2008)
Greenhouse gas emission 
savings on transport fuels 
of at least 45 percent 
(deferred until April 
2013 for installations in 
operation in January 2008), 
jumping to 60 percent from 
2016
Greenhouse gas emission 
savings of at least 35 percent 
(deferred until April 2013 for 
installations in operation in 
January 2008), jumping to 50 
percent from 2017; 60 percent 
for new installations operative 
from 2017
Not from land with 
“recognized high bioversity 
value” in or after January 2008
Biomass for energy not 
from land with recognized 
high diversity value in or 
after May 2003
Not from land with “recognized 
high bioversity value” in or after 
January 2008
Not from land “with high 
carbon stock” in January 2008
Biomass for energy not 
from land with high carbon 
stock in May 2003
Not from land “with high carbon 
stock” in January 2008
Only if “effective measures 
have been taken” to 
address a whole series of 
environmental issues and 
various social concerns 
are met, e.g. including 
“all workers must have 
legal contracts, must be 
remunerated fairly and must 
have, inter alia, the right 
to organise and bargain 
collectively and freedom 
from discrimination”
“The Commission shall report 
every two years ... on the impact 
on social sustainability in the 
Community and in third countries 
of increased demand for biofuel, 
and on the impact of EU biofuel 
policy on the availability of 
foodstuffs at affordable prices, 
in particular for people living in 
developing countries, and wider 
development issues. Reports 
shall address the respect of land 
use rights”
Commission to report 
by December 2010 on a 
sustainability scheme for energy 
uses of other biomass, including 
if appropriate proposals to 
extend to other biomass
The use of land for the 
production of biofuels shall 
not be allowed to compete 
with the use of land for the 
production of foods
Commission to report 
by December 2009 on a 
sustainability scheme for energy 
uses of other biomass, including 
if appropriate proposals to 
extend to other biomass
Table 1: Summary of sustainability criteria, proposed and adopted
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Private standards
The European Committee for Standardization 
(Comité Européen de Normalisation; CEN), 
which develops European Standards to apply 
in its 30 Member countries, has established 
a technical committee (CEN/TC 383) with 
six working parties to develop standards for 
“sustainably produced biomass for energy 
applications”.9 For example, Working Group 
4 is addressing social and economic aspects. 
CEN/TC 383’s work is mirrored in the UK in 
the British Standards Institution (BSI) PTI/20.10 
From a Group 4 meeting in the UK that the 
author has attended, it is unclear how the 
proposed CEN standard interacts with either 
EU law on sustainability or UK legislative 
initiatives (see Chapter 3): whether the CEN 
standard would simply reflect EU legislation, 
for example, acting as a private audit of the 
EU requirements, or whether it would be set 
at a much higher level, appealing to energy 
suppliers wishing to demonstrate their social 
and environmental accountability.
There are other international initiatives. One is 
the Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels, an “in-
ternational initiative bringing together farmers, 
companies, non-governmental organizations, ex-
perts, governments, and inter-governmental agen-
cies concerned with ensuring the sustainability of 
biofuels production and processing”, whose secre-
tariat and website are hosted by the École Poly-
technique Fédérale de Lausanne.11 This grouping 
has published Version Zero of its Principles and Cri-
teria for Sustainable Biofuels, which includes, for 
example, “Biofuels shall not violate human rights 
or labor rights, and shall ensure decent work and 
the well-being of workers” and “Biofuel produc-
tion shall not impair food security”.
figure 1: Percentage contribution to primary energy production, eu, 2005










In contrast to the 20 percent target for renew-
ables in 2020, the EU27 achieved 8.5 percent in 
2005 (Eurostat, 2008: 38), with a wide variation 
between Member States (Table 2). Given that some 
Member States already make considerable use of 
renewables, one can readily understand why they 
might have resisted adopting more. Annex 1 of the 
new renewable energy directive, reproduced in Ta-
ble 2.2, sets out the “mandatory national targets” 
that Member States are expected to achieve by 
2020. In 2005, biomass accounted for 66 percent of 
renewable primary energy production (Figure 1).
2.2 Renewables use in the eu
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Share of energy from renewable 
sources in gross final consumption of 
energy, 2005
Target for share of energy from 
renewable sources in gross final 
consumption of energy, 2020
Belgium 2.2 percent 13 percent
Bulgaria 9.4 percent 16 percent
Czech Republic 6.1 percent 13 percent
Denmark 17.0 percent 30 percent
Germany 5.8 percent 18 percent
Estonia 18.0 percent 25 percent
Ireland 3.1 percent 16 percent
Greece 6.9 percent 18 percent
Spain 8.7 percent 20 percent
France 10.3 percent 23 percent
Italy 5.2 percent 17 percent
Cyprus 2.9 percent 13 percent
Latvia 32.6 percent 40 percent
Lithuania 15.0 percent 23 percent
Luxembourg 0.9 percent 11 percent
Hungary 4.3 percent 13 percent
Malta 0.0 percent 10 percent
Netherlands 2.4 percent 14 percent
Austria 23.3 percent 34 percent
Poland 7.2 percent 15 percent
Portugal 20.5 percent 31 percent
Romania 17.8 percent 24 percent
Slovenia 16.0 percent 25 percent
Slovak Republic 6.7 percent 14 percent
Finland 28.5 percent 38 percent
Sweden 39.8 percent 49 percent
United Kingdom 1.3 percent 15 percent
table 2: Percentage share of renewables in eu-27 gross energy consumption, 
2005, and targets for 2020
Source: European Parliament (2008d: Annex 1)
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In 2003 biofuels accounted for a mere 0.6 
percent of total transport fuel supplies, and 
in no Member State was it higher than 1.33 
percent (Sweden) (Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities, 2006a: 19). By 2006, 
according to United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) estimates, the overall 
percentage had risen to 2.06 percent and 
was forecast to rise to 3.75 percent in 2010 
(Table 3). It is evident that biodiesel has 
been, and remains, a more important fuel 
than bioethanol in the EU.
EU biodiesel production is based largely on 
rapeseed oil, although soybean oil (presumably 
derived from imported soybeans) and imported 
palm oil are also important ingredients (Table 
4). Imports of biodiesel accounted for less than 
3 percent of EU biodiesel consumption in 2006, 
but the USDA forecasts a 14 percent market 
share in the latter part of the decade.
2006 2007 e 2008 e 2009 f 2010 f
Biodiesel 4170 5460 6000 7610 8960
Pure 
vegetable oil
915 620 415 190 200





0 0 5 10 10
Total biofuels 6030 7430 8120 9865 11 740
Biofuels as a 
share of total 
transport fuel 
used
2.06 percent 2.49 percent 2.68 percent 3.21 percent 3.75 percent
table 3: estimated eu-27 biofuel consumption (ktoe*)
e, estimate; f, forecast.
* Various fuels and biofuel differ in their energy content, thus the data in the table are stated in 1000 
tonnes of oil equivalent (ktoe) to provide better comparability.
Source: USDA (2008a: 5).
Source 2006 2007 e 2008 e 2009 f 2010 f
Rapeseed oil 3150 3550 3700 4900 5650
Soybean oil 800 900 900 1000 1200
Palm oil 150 400 400 420 450
Sunflower 180 220 300 420 450
Other and not 
attributed
110 110 100 100 160
subtotal 
vegetable oils
4390 5180 5400 6840 7910
Recycled 
vegetable oil
120 135 230 300 490
Animal fats 10 35 130 160 200
grand total 4520 5350 5760 7300 8600
table 4: eu-27 biodiesel production, imports and consumption (1000 tonnes), and 
percentage share of diesel market
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In contrast, bioethanol imports account for a 
much larger share of the EU’s bioethanol mar-
ket than is the case for biodiesel and diesel: 
almost 40 percent in 2009 according to USDA 
estimates (Table 5).
Source 2006 2007 e 2008 e 2009 f 2010 f
Imports 136 750 1000 1200 1400
Consumption 4658 6100 6700 8500 10 000
Biodiesel 
share of diesel 
market
2.3 percent 3.0 percent 3.2 percent 4.0 percent 4.6 percent
table 4: eu-27 biodiesel production, imports and consumption (1000 tonnes), and 
percentage share of diesel market cont.
e, estimate; f, forecast.
2006 2007 e 2008 e 2009 f 2010 f
Production 1584 1711 2155 2535 3346
Imports 317 995 1267 1584 1774
Exports 38 44 63 63 51




0.8 percent 1.2 percent 1.5 percent 1.8 percent 2.2 percent
Source: USDA (2008a: 9, 11, 13).
table 5: eu-27 bioethanol production, trade and consumption (million litres), and 
percentage share of petrol market
Source: USDA (2008a: 13, 17).
e, estimate; f, forecast.
Availability of source materials, and past poli-
cies pursued in the Member States, strongly 
influenced the development of the biofuels in-
dustry. Table 6, from a different source than 
earlier tables in this section, gives an overview 
of the situation in 2007, before EU targets had 
begun to bite. Germany is seen to be the domi-
nant producer and consumer of biodiesel, and 
many Member States (notably the UK) have a 
low level of self-sufficiency.
Biodiesel Bioethanol
C TOE P TOE SS C TOE P TOE SS
Germany 2 957 463 2 485 400 0.84 293 078 200 940 0.69
France 1 161 277 749 920 0.65 272 937 294 780 1.08
Austria 367 140 229 620 0.63 21 883
Spain 260 580 144 480 0.55 112 640 177 480 1.58
UK 270 660 129 000 0.48 78 030 10 200 0.13
Sweden 99 602 54 180 0.54 181 649 35 700 0.20
Portugal 158 853 150 500 0.95 0
Italy 139 350 312 180 2.24 0 30 600
Bulgaria 46 336 7740 0.17 66 160
table 6: Biodiesel and bioethanol production and consumption, by Member state, 2007
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Biodiesel Bioethanol
C TOE P TOE SS C TOE P TOE SS
Poland 15 480 68 800 4.44 85 200 79 050 0.93
Belgium 91 260 142 760 1.56 0
Greece 80 840 86 000 1.06 0
Lithuania 41 000 22 360 0.55 11 600 10 200 0.88
Luxembourg 34 098 0 0.00 865
Czech Republic 32 660 52 460 1.61 180 16 830 93.50
Slovenia 12 993 9 460 0.73 794
Slovakia 39 560 13 262 15 300 1.15
Hungary 0 6 020 9180 15 300 1.67
Netherlands 73 100 8670 7140 0.82
Ireland 4612 2 580 0.56 2352
Denmark 0 73 100 6025






Total 5774k 4913k 0.85 1166k 902k 0.77
C, consumption; P, production; SS, self-sufficiency (production/consumption).
Blanks indicate missing production data, and “not available” consumption data, in the original source.
Consumption data were reported in tonnes of oil equivalent (TOE), but production data were converted 
from tonnes of biodiesel (at 1 tonne of biodiesel = 0.86 TOE) and litres of bioethanol (at 1 m3 of 
bioethanol = 0.51 TOE).
table 6: Biodiesel and bioethanol production and consumption, by Member state, 
2007 cont.
Source: EurObserv’ER (2008: Tables T2, T3 and T5).
This scheme began in January 2005 and is 
characterized as a “cap and trade” scheme. 
Initially the only greenhouse gas covered was 
carbon dioxide, but there are ambitions to widen 
the scheme’s scope. Similarly, the scheme does 
not cover all emitters of carbon dioxide: it covers 
heat and power generation, and heavy industry 
such as iron and steel, and cement works. A 
size threshold applies, excluding smaller units. 
Member States allocate emission permits to the 
companies subject to the scheme, determining 
the maximum amount of carbon dioxide they 
can emit. If they want to emit more, they must 
acquire additional permits. If, by reductions in 
energy consumption or increased use of nuclear 
or renewable energy, they emit fewer carbon 
dioxide emissions emanating from fossil fuels, 
then they will have permits to sell. Thus, a market 
in permits can arise. In 2008 the Commission 
claimed: “At present some 11 000 installations 
in the EU are included, accounting for around 
50 percent of the EU’s total CO2 emissions and 
about 40  percent of its overall greenhouse gas 
emissions” (European Commission, 2008c: 13). 
Phase I ran from 2005 to end 2007, and Phase 
II from 2008 through 2012. The Climate Change 
Package adopted by the European Parliament 
(ibid.: 3–5) in December 2008 forms part of the 
2.3 the eu’s greenhouse gas emission trading scheme
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review for the post-2013 regime. The plan is 
to expand the coverage to new industries (e.g. 
petrochemicals), add two more greenhouse 
gasses (nitrous oxide and perfluorocarbons), and 
begin allocating allowances by auction rather 
than the current practice of free distribution to 
the industrial operators concerned.
Although much could be, and has been, written 
about the allocation procedures and the effec-
tiveness of the EU’s Emission Trading Scheme, a 
more robust “price” emerged for Phase II carbon 
dioxide emission permits than had been the case 
under Phase I – until, that is, prices collapsed 
with the onset of the global recession.12 For 
those companies subject to the Emissions Trad-
ing Scheme, there is a further financial incen-
tive to use biomass to generate electricity, or to 
provide heat and power, because by burning bio-
mass rather than fossil fuels the emission of fos-
sil carbon dioxide is reduced, so releasing emis-
sion certificates for sale on the open market.
Relevant provisions of the CAP are outlined in 
Chapter 4, and its import regime for biofuels in 
Chapter 5. Here, brief mention is made of the 
Fuel Quality Directive and the Energy Taxation 
Directive.
Fuel Quality Directive13
The Fuel Quality Directive forms part of the 
EU’s single market legislation: by setting out 
minimum technical standards with which 
products must comply, technical barriers 
to trade within the EU can be eliminated; 
although of course, if different standards apply 
from one international jurisdiction to another, 
international trade barriers can be created. We 
return to this in Chapter 6.
In January 2007, the Commission tabled pro-
posals to amend the Directive (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2007b), and these 
too formed part of the European Parliament’s 
Climate Change Package agreed in December 
2008. For the purpose of this report, two el-
ements are particularly relevant. First, the 
changes should facilitate the inclusion of bio-
ethanol in petrol. Second, suppliers “should 
reduce ... greenhouse gas emissions caused by 
extraction or cultivation, including land-use 
changes, transport and distribution, processing 
and combustion of fuels, by up to 20 percent by 
2020” (European Parliament, 2008c: 14). Two 
ways in which they could do this are by improv-
ing the efficiency of their refinery operations 
and by including more biofuel in their supplies.
Energy Taxation Directive14
The purpose of this Directive is to set 
minimum rates of taxation applicable to 
energy products when used as motor or 
heating fuels and to electricity. Its aim is 
thus to improve the operation of the inter-
nal market by reducing distortions of com-
petition between mineral oils and other 
energy products. In line with the Commu-
nity’s objectives and the Kyoto Protocol, 
it encourages more efficient use of energy 
so as to reduce dependence on imported 
energy products and limit greenhouse gas 
emissions.15
Specifically, Member States are allowed to apply 
total or partial exemption from taxes for biofu-
els and for “forms of energy which are of solar, 
wind, tidal or geothermal origin, or from biomass 
or waste”. Kutas, Lindberg and Steenblik (2007) 
provide a detailed inventory of the implementa-
tion of the directive as of July 2007.
2.4 other eu legislation
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As explained in Chapter 2, although the EU is in 
the process of setting mandatory targets for the 
use of renewables in primary energy use, and for 
road transport and other framework legislation, 
it is the responsibility of the Member States to 
devise the incentive packages to deliver these 
targets. Rather than attempt to cover all 27 
Member States, this chapter focuses on the UK, 
although it should be recalled that the UK is 
not necessarily representative of the whole. As 
with other Member States, the UK already had 
policies in place, reflecting its own national 
policy priorities and the advisory targets 
established by the EU in the past.
The 2020 RO for the UK has been set at 15 
percent compared with the 1.3 percent actually 
achieved in 2005 (see Table 2). The Renewables 
Advisory Board has said of this target that if 
it “is to be approached we need to establish 
a different energy world with new policy, 
economic and social drivers” (Renewables 
Advisory Board, 2008: 4) and that, on the basis 
of current policies (their “business a usual” 
scenario), their “best estimate is that the 
UK will achieve about 6 percent of ... energy 
from renewables” (ibid.: 3). Thus, new policy 
initiatives would be needed.
In addition to capital funding under the CAP’s 
Rural Development Regulation (see Chapter 
4), most Member States have other incentive 
programmes to encourage investment in 
bioenergy facilities. One such scheme is the 
Bio-energy Capital Grants Scheme in England, 
now administered by the Department of Energy 
and Climate Change. The grant is at “a variable 
rate of up to 40 percent of the difference in 
cost of installing the biomass boiler or CHP 
plant compared to installing the fossil fuel 
alternative”, to a maximum of £500 000 in the 
current fifth round.16
3. uk IMPLeMentAtIon
Since 2002, licensed electricity suppliers in the 
UK have had to source some of their supplies 
from renewables or face a financial penalty. 
The obligation had risen to 9.1 percent for 
the obligation period 2008–09, beginning on 1 
April 2008, and was set to rise to 15.4 percent 
in 2015 and then hold steady to 2027, when 
the obligation would cease. The Renewables 
Advisory Board, in its 2020 Vision, warned that 
if the EU’s 15 percent renewables target was 
to be met, then “approximately 40 percent of 
the grid-connected electricity market” would 
have to be fed from renewables (Renewables 
Advisory Board, 2008: 4) and that “investors 
need confidence that the renewables market 
will support investments made between 
now and 2020 well beyond the current RO 
mechanism that terminates in 2027” (ibid.: 5). 
Under the Energy Act 2008, which completed its 
passage through Parliament in November 2008, 
the predetermined percentage is replaced 
by an annual obligation set “at a certain 
level above the forecast level of renewables 
deployment from year to year (‘guaranteed 
headroom’).” A consultation in June 2008 
sought views on further possible changes to the 
existing mechanisms, for example whether the 
obligation should be extended to 2035, given 
that new investments after 2015 were unlikely 
with a 2027 end date (Department for Business 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 2008b: 96). 
In the 2008 Pre-Budget Report, the government 
announced the extension of the RO to “at least 
2037”, while stressing that “the extension ... 
does not mean that we intend to provide an 
additional ten years of support to all existing 
projects” (Department of Energy and Climate 
Change, 2008: 15–16).17 For existing projects, 
the support mechanisms of the RO will continue 
until 2027, and all projects are guaranteed at 
least 17 years of support.
When electricity is produced from renewable 
sources, the generator receives renewable 
obligation certificates (ROCs). Until April 2009 
it was one ROC for each megawatt hour (MWh) 
generated. Electricity suppliers have to acquire 
sufficient ROCs to match the obligation, by 
generating renewable electricity themselves or 
buying ROCs from independent generators, or else 
3.1 uk: renewables obligation
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they must “buy out” their obligation. At the start 
of the scheme in 2002, the buy-out price was set at 
£30 per MWh (3 pence per kWh), and it increases 
annually in line with inflation (Department of 
Trade and Industry, 2007: 147). The revenues are 
paid into a fund administered by the Office of 
Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem),18 which is 
then shared out between the electricity suppliers 
that have redeemed ROCs. ROCs are traded. The 
Non-Fossil Purchasing Agency (http://www.nfpa.
co.uk) arranges online auctions for its clients, 
usually four times a year, for a fee of 50 pence 
per ROC (subject to a minimum fee of £50). The 
average price received for ROCs at the January 
2009 auction was £51.81 (Figure 2).
At first glance it is not obvious why electricity 
suppliers would buy ROCs at auction at a price 
in excess of the buy-out price. However, as 
noted above, when they redeem ROCs they 
become entitled to a share of the funds that 
Ofgem has collected from suppliers that have 
bought out their obligation. Thus, the auction 
price for ROCs is a gross price: the net price 
that electricity providers expect to pay must 
also take into account their expected receipts 
from Ofgem when they redeem their ROCs, and 
it will be profitable for them to bid for ROCs 
only if the expected net price is less than the 
buy-out price.
The value of the ROC is an important part of the 
revenue stream for independent generators of 
“green” electricity that they sell on to retail 
suppliers. For example, the Bioenergy RE-Gener-
ation Project (2007: 5) reported electricity pric-
es of about £30 per MWh in July 2007. Clearly 
the electricity consumer is paying a higher price 
for electricity as a result of the RO.
The sale value of the ROC is highly dependent 
on the market balance. If, overall, the 
supply of renewable energy falls short of the 
obligation, Ofgem receives revenues that are 
then recirculated to those businesses that have 
redeemed ROCs, and then the market value of 
the ROC exceeds the buy-out price. If there 
were no overall shortage and no need for any 
supplier to pay the buy-out price, then the 
market value of ROCs would be less than the 
buy-out price and would fall away to zero if all 
licensed electricity suppliers were able to meet 
their own needs. This “cliff-edge” scenario 
is one that has troubled private investors in 
green technology. Following adoption of the 
figure 2: Quarterly auction prices for renewable obligation certificates (RoCs) (£) 
(January, April, July, october)
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Energy Act 2008, the government intends to 
set the obligation on an annual basis, to “keep 
RO levels” above the level of renewables 
generation “up to our existing aspiration 
for some 20 percent of electricity to come 
from renewables” (Department of Energy and 
Climate Change, 2008: 27). Thus, for 2009–10, 
with the new “banding” system in place (see 
below), the obligation will be 9.7 ROCs per 100 
MWh supplied (ibid.: 27).
The new “banding” regime addresses concerns 
that, by treating all renewables equally in the 
grant of ROCs, there was too much support given 
to some technologies, and too little to others. 
Thus, the Energy White Paper had flagged the 
idea that, from April 2009, more ROCs should be 
given for the newer, emerging technologies. As 
a result, the Energy Act 2008 gave the govern-
ment powers to implement a new Renewables 
Obligation Order, to put into practice this new 
banding system, as outlined in Table 7, which 
it did as of 1 April 2009. This will make some 
bioenergy projects more financially attractive 
(e.g. anaerobic digestion) and others less so 
(e.g. landfill gas), but some existing invest-
ments will be protected as a result of “grand-
fathering” provisions. It also gives a higher ROC 
allocation to technologies that combine heat 
and power generation (CHP); the government 
has also announced plans to explore the possi-
bility of introducing a separate Renewable Heat 
Incentive. If such a scheme were to be intro-
duced, these bandings would change (Depart-
ment of Energy and Climate Change, 2008: 6). 
The government believes that, between 2009 
and 2013, when the results of the next banding 
review will be implemented, one ROC will on 
average be issued for each MWh of renewable 
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Co-firing of biomass 0.5
Co-firing of energy crops 1
table 7: the uk’s renewable obligation certificate (RoC) banding 
regime, from April 2009
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The Energy Bill also contains provisions for 
the government to introduce feed-in tariffs 
for operators with up to 5 MW capacity, and 
it intends to consult on the details of this in 
summer 2009 (Department of Energy and Cli-
mate Change, 2008: 15). Feed-in tariffs, as 
used for example in Germany, are widely can-
vassed as a superior alternative to a renew-
ables obligation (e.g. see Mitchell, Bauknecht 
and Connor, 2006). Although many variants 
are possible (and, as noted, the British gov-
ernment is about to consult on this), the basic 
idea is that some external authority deter-
mines the tariff that the electricity supplier 
must pay the generator for renewable elec-
tricity, with higher rates for newly emerging 
technologies, thus guaranteeing both the sale 
price and the outlet. Although electricity sup-
pliers have a financial incentive to acquire 
ROCs from renewable electricity generators, 
they are not obliged to buy the electricity as 
well; and negotiating access to the system is 
not necessarily a trivial issue, especially for 
small-scale generators.
Generation type ROCs/MWh
Co-firing of biomass with CHP 1
Co-firing of energy crop with CHP 1.5
Dedicated biomass 1.5
Dedicated energy crops 2
Dedicated biomass with CHP 2
Dedicated energy crops with CHP 2
CHP, combined heat and power.
Source: Department of Energy and Climate Change (2008: 7–8). An extended version of the table, 
“including the definitions for each type”, was made available at http://www.tinyurl.com/64cuq9.
table 7: the uk’s renewable obligation certificate (RoC) banding 
regime, from April 2009 cont.
As noted in Chapter 2, in 2003 the Biofuels Direc-
tive set non-mandatory “reference values” of a 
2 percent market share for biofuels in 2005 and 
a 5.75 percent share in 2010. To help achieve 
this policy goal, the Energy Taxation Directive 
allowed Member States to apply an abated rate 
of tax for biofuels used for transport. In the 
UK this results in an abatement of 20 pence per 
litre on bioethanol and biodiesel for road trans-
port, which the government has promised will be 
maintained until at least 2010 (Department of 
Trade and Industry, 2007: 242), compared with 
the full tax rate of 52.35 pence per litre applied 
from 1 December 2008 to 31 March 2009.
The basic legal requirement in the UK is that road 
fuel duty must be paid on all fuel substitutes 
before these are used to power a vehicle. 
Consequently, a business cannot simply make 
biodiesel from used cooking fats without first 
making arrangements to pay the appropriate 
duty to HM Revenue and Customs, and the 
abated rate (i.e. 20 pence per litre less than 
the full rate) will apply only if the producer can 
demonstrate to HM Revenue and Customs that 
“their product meets all aspects of the legal 
definition [of biodiesel in this quotation] and 
sufficient tests must be carried out to prove the 
specification is met”.19
It is instructive to contrast the different expe-
riences of Germany and the UK with respect 
to the taxation of road fuel. In Germany, the 
traditional approach had been to tax only min-
eral oils, and so biodiesel, as B100, was exempt 
from duty. Thus, from the early 1990s, B100 
was a cheap alternative to conventional diesel, 
particularly for transport fleets with dedicated 
supply lines. In 2004, this duty concession was 
extended to the biofuels included in blends 
3.2 uk: taxation of transport fuels
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such as B5, considerably expanding the mar-
ket (Bomb et al., 2007: 2259). However, from 
January 2007 Germany introduced mandatory 
blending requirements (of 4.4 percent energy 
content for biodiesel and 2 percent for etha-
nol), and began reducing the tax relief on this 
mandatory proportion in a phased fashion until 
2012. Thus, the biofuel duty was fixed at €0.09 
per litre for 2007, and it will increase to the full 
€0.45 applied to mineral oils in 2012 (Agra Eu-
rope, 2006b: N/3). By contrast, in the UK it was 
road transport fuel that was taxed, and it was 
not until 2002 that duty reductions applied on 
biodiesel (and extended to bioethanol in 2005) 
(Bomb et al., 2007: 2261), and even then at a far 
less generous rate than in Germany. It is not only 
Germany that is reducing tax breaks on biofu-
els: France too has been reducing its tax rebates 
and, in its 2009 Budget Bill, indicated its inten-
tion of eliminating them in 2012 (USDA, 2008b).
The UK introduced an RTFO in April 2008, similar 
to the RO for electricity suppliers. The govern-
ment’s intention is that the RTFO will last until 
“at least 2020”. An “obligated company” is one 
that supplies more than 450 000 litres per year 
of hydrocarbon oil road transport fuel (Renew-
able Fuels Agency, 2009: Glossary). The RTFO is 
2.5 percent (by volume) of each obligated com-
pany’s aggregate fuel sales in 2008, and it was 
planned that it should increase in 3.75 percent 
in 2009 and 5 percent from 2010 (but see be-
low). Thereafter, it will be increased, provided 
fuel and vehicle technical standards allow (in 
particular, that blends of more than 5 percent 
do not lead to mechanical problems), that bio-
fuels are produced sustainably, and that “the 
costs to consumers will be acceptable, both in 
terms of fuel prices at the pump, and in terms 
of wider economic impacts, including for ex-
ample the impacts on food prices and other in-
dustries which make use of similar feedstocks” 
(Department of Trade and Industry, 2007: 242). 
The government is developing Environmental 
Assurance Schemes, because RTFO suppliers 
will need to demonstrate the carbon savings 
they are claiming.
Renewable transport fuel obligation certificates 
(RTFOCs) are issued on the quantity of renew-
able fuel on which duty has been paid. These 
certificates are then used to demonstrate com-
pliance. Certificates are tradable, but suppli-
ers of fossil fuels can buy out their obligation. 
As with ROCs, these buy-out revenues are then 
shared out among the suppliers that have re-
deemed RTFOCs. For the first two years the 
buy-out price has been set at 15 pence per litre, 
and the government has guaranteed that “the 
total package of support (buy-out + duty incen-
tive)” will be 35 pence in 2009–10 and 30 pence 
in 2010–11.20 In the 2008 Budget, the Chancellor 
announced that the fuel tax rebate would cease 
in 2010 and that the RTFO buy-out price would 
be set at 30 pence per litre (HM Treasury, 2008: 
Paragraph 6.34).
The Renewable Fuels Agency is also responsible 
for implementing the government’s plans on 
sustainability. Suppliers have to “report on the 
level of carbon savings and sustainability of the 
biofuels they supply”. If they fail to do so, they 
will not be issued with RTFOCs. From 2010 “the 
Government aims to reward biofuels under the 
RTFO according to the amount of carbon they 
save” and subject to EU and WTO constraints; 
and from 2011 “the Government aims to reward 
biofuels under the RTFO only if they meet ap-
propriate sustainability standards”.21
In the first six months of the scheme (15 April–14 
October 2008), the RTFO was surpassed, partly 
as a result of a drafting error in the regulations, 
and consequently some RTFOCs will be carried 
forward to 2009–10. RTFOCs were trading at 
just below 10 pence per litre in November 2008 
(private communication, 16 November 2008). 
Between April and October 2008, 16 percent of 
RTFOC supplies were of bioethanol, 84 percent 
of biodiesel, and a very small quantity of bio-
gas. Interestingly, most was imported or made 
from imported feedstock (Table 8).
Because of concerns that biofuels can adversely 
affect the environment and fuel food prices, 
the government asked the chairman of the Re-
3.3 the uk’s Renewable transport fuel obligation
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newable Fuels Agency, Professor Ed Gallagher, 
to review the situation (Renewable Fuels Agen-
cy, 2008). The Gallagher Review concluded that 
“The assessments underpinning the EU 2020 10 
percent target and RTFO did not adequately ad-
dress indirect land use change”; and it recom-
mended that, although the existing target for 
2008–09 should remain unchanged, the RTFO 
Order should nonetheless be “amended to re-
quire a lower rate of increase of 0.5 percent 
pa rising to a maximum of 5 percent by volume 
by 2013” (ibid.: 14). In January 2009, the gov-
ernment announced an RTFO of 3.25 percent in 
2009–10 – midway between the Gallagher Re-
view’s 3.0 percent and the originally mandated 
3.5 percent – and thereafter increasing progres-
sively to 5 percent in 2013–14 (Department for 
Transport, 2009).
Main origins Bioethanol Biodiesel




Unknown 0 percent 23 percent
table 8: Renewable transport fuel obligation (Rtfo) 
fuel sources, 15 April–14 october 2008
Source: Renewable Fuels Agency (2009: RTFO graphs).
There are a number of reasons why govern-
ments might wish to tax fuel for road trans-
port. Three reasons apply, regardless of the 
characteristics of the fuel: (i) to raise revenue 
for the general government budget, (ii) to cov-
er the cost of road provision and (iii) to as a 
proxy for a tax on congestion. A congestion tax 
would, potentially, be more effective, and ef-
ficient, if applied as a charge (or toll) on road 
use, which could be varied according to levels 
of congestion; and the revenues could be ap-
plied to cover the cost of providing and main-
taining the road system.
The fourth reason that could be advanced for 
taxing road fuel is as an environmental tax on 
greenhouse gas emissions. Economists would 
tend to argue that any use of fossil fuels that 
resulted in carbon dioxide emissions (or release 
of carbon sinks from the soil, wood, etc.) should 
attract such a tax and that, by taxing only one 
use, economic distortions are created; but the 
political reality, for the moment, is that it is 
road fuel that is the focus of attention.
So what would be the appropriate carbon tax on 
fossil fuels (petrol and diesel) used in road trans-
port? One litre of petrol releases 2.32 kg CO2 when 
used, and one litre of diesel releases 2.63 kg CO2.
22 
When buying a flight with the airline BA, passen-
gers are advised that they can offset their carbon 
emissions by purchasing an offset through Morgan 
Stanley. On 12 November 2008, the quoted price 
was £17.60 per tonne of CO2. This is somewhat 
lower than the British government’s shadow price 
of carbon for policy analysis: for 2009, this is fixed 
at £26.50 per tonne of CO2.
23
But using the government’s figure of £26.50 per 
tonne, the cost of abating the direct carbon di-
oxide emissions of petrol and diesel would be 
6.1 and 6.9 pence per litre, respectively. Recall 
that the rebate on road fuel tax for both etha-
nol and biodiesel is 20 pence per litre; thus, 
the larger part of the road fuel tax rebate (and 
any financial inducement inherent in the RTFO) 
must be there for some other reason, such as 
encouraging investment in the industry.
3.4 the rationale for road fuel taxation?
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There are relatively few CAP provisions that 
directly encourage biomass production for 
energy purposes. These are discussed in turn 
below.
4. CAP PoLICY MeAsuRes
Under the set-aside arrangements introduced into 
the CAP by the MacSharry reforms of 1992, set-
aside land could be used for non-food crops (in-
cluding crops grown for bioenergy purposes), pro-
vided that contractual arrangements ensured that 
the product did not reappear in the CAP supported 
market. Crops with no food or animal feed poten-
tial could be grown without contract. This allowed 
extra revenues to be earned from set-aside land, 
without forfeiting the set-aside payment. Detailed 
rules were set out by the Department for Environ-
ment, Food and Rural Affairs (2005).
Set-aside is, however, is to be abolished. With 
the introduction of the Single Payment Scheme 
(SPS) in 2005 (see below), the retention of set-
aside looked rather odd, and the surge in world 
commodity prices in 2007–08 sealed its fate. In 
September 2007, EU farm ministers agreed to 
reduce the set-aside rate to 0 percent for the 
2008 crop (Agra Europe, 2007b: EP/5); and in 
November 2008, as part of the so-called “Health 
Check” reform of the CAP, ministers agreed that 
set-aside be abolished from 2009 (Commission 
of the European Communities, 2008b: 8; Agra 
Europe, 2008b: EP/6).
Set-aside payments have been declared by the 
EU in the blue box (see Chapter 6 for further 
explanation), but the declaration does not dif-
ferentiate between land used for bioenergy 
crops and other uses.
In the Uruguay Round, following the accord 
with the USA at the Blair House meeting in No-
vember 1992, the EU committed itself to limit 
its production of oilseeds on set-aside land, as 
part of the package agreed to settle the long-
standing oilseeds dispute (Swinbank and Tan-
ner, 1996: 131–2). Specifically Paragraph 7 of 
the Memorandum of Understanding on Oilseeds 
stated that if the by-products of this produc-
tion exceeded “one million metric tonnes an-
nually expressed in soybean meal equivalents”, 
then the EU would take “appropriate corrective 
action”.24 This rather imprecise provision was 
never triggered. Earlier in the text, Paragraph 
2 had specified that the provisions related to 
“crop specific oilseeds payments”; and the EU 
argued that crop-specific payments ceased with 
the Agenda 2000 reforms in 1999, when the ar-
able area aid payments for oilseeds were har-
monized with those for cereals.
4.1 set-aside
The Fischler reforms of 2003 introduced a 
further element of decoupling (Swinbank and 
Daugbjerg, 2006). The SPS replaced the area 
and headage payments that had applied since 
1992, under which crops had to be grown and 
animals kept if the payment was to be claimed. 
In most Member States, including the UK, the 
SPS is fully decoupled from crop production, 
which should mean that there is no policy 
inducement to grow one particular type of 
crop rather than another. There are, however, 
various cross-compliance rules, applicable to 
the whole farm, if the SPS payment is to be 
collected without penalty.
4.2 single Payment scheme
In the framework of the SPS, a new, coupled, 
scheme was introduced: farmers could claim 
a payment of €45 per hectare, subject to a 
maximum area of 2 million hectares across 
the EU-27, if they grew energy crops. The ar-
eas claimed in the first three years fell short 
of this. In 2007, though, claims were submitted 
for about 2.84 million hectares, meaning that 
all the claims had a reduction coefficient of 
0.70337 applied (European Commission, 2007). 
In its discussion document “Preparing for the 
‘Health Check’ of the CAP reform”, the Commis-
sion had said: “it should be examined whether 
the present support scheme for energy crops is 
4.3 energy Crops scheme
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still cost effective in the light of new incentives 
for biomass production (compulsory energy tar-
gets and high prices)”.25 It also emphasized the 
crucial role of research on “second generation 
biofuels” and suggested that “incentives for 
developing second generation biofuels should 
be reinforced within [rural development] mea-
sures” (Commission of the European Commu-
nities, 2007c, Paragraph 4.2). Accordingly, it 
did propose the abolition of the energy crops 
scheme from 2010 (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2008b: 19, 85), and in November 
2008 the Council accepted this (Agra Europe, 
2008b: EP/6).
The Energy Crops Scheme has been declared 
as blue box support (WTO, 2009: 23). Total ex-
penditure, however, was capped at €90 million, 
which is trivial in relation to the €13 445.2 mil-
lion in blue box expenditure declared for 2005–
06 (WTO, 2009: Supporting Table DS:3).
In 2007 about 4 million hectares (mostly rapeseed) 
was devoted to energy crop production (Table 9), 
compared with 59.2 million hectares devoted to 
cereals (excluding rice) and 4.8 million hectares 
in rape across the EU-27 in 2005 (European Com-
mission, 2008a: Table 3.5.2.2). Table 9 shows the 
growth in the use of the energy crop premium, a 
static level of production on set-aside land (al-
though it is unclear from this source whether the 
data refer to all non-food crops on set-aside land 
or only to energy crops), and a sharp drop in 2007 
in land in neither set-aside nor the energy crops 
scheme, and presumably reflecting the higher re-
turns farmers expected from food crops.
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total non-food on set-aside land, of which: 0.9 0.5 0.9 1.0 1.0
rapeseed 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.8
cereals 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Land use with energy crop premium, of which: 0.3 0.6 1.3 2.8
rapeseed 0.2 0.4 0.8 2.0
cereals 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Other, of which: 0.3 0.8 1.6 1.4 0.2
rapeseed 1.3 0.9 0.1
cereals 0.3 0.4 0.2
Total 1.2 1.6 3.1 3.7 4.0
table 9: eu arable land with energy crops, by type of support (million ha)
2006: EU-25; 2007: EU-27, estimated.
“Other” is calculated from oilseed and cereal market balance sheets.
Source: European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/bioenergy/index_en.htm. Accessed 7 November 2008
In the recent reform of the sugar sector, sug-
ar beet grown for bioethanol production was 
made exempt from the quota mechanism. 
Throughout the history of the wine regime, 
surplus wine has been distilled; although some 
of the resulting alcohol has been potable, 
much has been used as bioethanol (Swinbank 
and Ritson, 1992: 41–5).26 Other intervention 
stocks have also been disposed of in this way: 
for example, “In 2005 ... a tender for rye from 
intervention stocks was opened specifically for 
bioethanol production” (Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities, 2006b: 12). In addition 
there are long-standing national aid schemes 
for “ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin” that 
are reported as part of the EU’s Aggregate 
Measurement of Support (WTO, 2009: Support-
ing Table DS:8).
4.4 sugar, wine, rye...
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A differentiation is made between Pillar 1 and 
Pillar 2 of the CAP. Pillar 1 refers to the mar-
ket price and income supports, including the 
SPS, and applies uniformly throughout the EU 
(although transitional arrangements are still in 
place in the new member states). Pillar 2 refers 
to measures undertaken under the Rural Devel-
opment Regulation. This has three axes: Axis 1 
provides for grant aid to improve the competi-
tiveness of farm businesses; Axis 2 funds agri-
environmental measures; and Axis 3 provides 
for grant aid to diversify the rural economy 
and improve the quality of life in rural areas. 
(There is also an overarching provision to aid 
local initiatives under the Liaison Entre Actions 
pour le Developpement de L’Economie Rurale 
(LEADER) programme.) Member States have 
to draw up their own rural development plans 
from a menu of provisions laid down in Regula-
tion 1698/2005, covering the period 2007–13, 
for approval by the Commission.
Under their rural development programmes, 
Member States can give grants to facilitate the 
establishment of bioenergy projects but, be-
cause of the discretion allowed, schemes (and 
funding) can differ significantly from one Mem-
ber State to another and even within Member 
States.
In England, under the Energy Crops Scheme, 
farmers were initially invited to apply for grant 
aid to establish Miscanthus (at £800 per hect-
are) and short-rotation coppice (£1000 per hect-
are).27 This followed on from a similar scheme 
in the previous programme in 2000–06. However, 
the scheme, as approved by the Commission, 
switched from a fixed area payment to one cal-
culated at 40 percent of “actual establishment 
costs” determined on a case-by-case basis.28
As we saw earlier, in its preliminary reflections 
on the “Health Check”, the Commission sug-
gested that the Rural Development Regulation 
should be amended to give enhanced support 
to second-generation biofuels (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2007c: Paragraph 
4.2); and in its formal proposals of May 2008, 
a number of “indicative types of operations” 
were listed for inclusion by the Member States 
in their rural development plans from 2010. Un-
der “renewable energies”, the four examples 
given were: biogas production (both “on farm 
and local production”); perennial energy crops 
such as herbaceous grasses; “processing of agri-
cultural/forest biomass for renewable energy”; 
and installation of infrastructure for renewable 
energy production (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2008c: 141, 145–6). This proposal 
was adopted by the Council in November 2008 
(Agra Europe, 2008b: EP/7).
4.5 Pillar 2
23ICTSD Programme on Agricultural Trade and Sustainable Development
The EU imports both raw materials for bioen-
ergy production and biofuels. In this chapter we 
set out the tariffs that would apply to biofuels, 
try to give some indication of trade volumes, 
and outline the issues related to the alleged 
“dumping” of biodiesel from the USA.
Although we have no data on imports of biomass 
for electricity generation, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that this is a potentially important trade. 
Not only are companies investing in new plant to 
take advantage of EU farm production, but also 
they are investing in ports. For example, in Sep-
tember 2008, Welsh Power announced plans for 
a new £140 million biomass facility in Newport, 
South Wales, located in the disused South Dock, 
and supplied by boat with wood chips and energy 
crops.29 Some imported vegetable oils have been 
used for electricity generation.
5. IMPoRt ARRAngeMents AnD tRADe
In its Roadmap, the Commission comment-
ed frankly: “From a trade perspective, the 
EU maintains significant import protection 
on some types of biofuels, notably ethanol 
which has a tariff protection level of around 
45 percent ad valorem. Import duties on 
other biofuels – biodiesel and vegetable oils 
– are much lower... If it would appear that 
supply of sustainable biofuels to the EU is 
constrained, the EU should be ready to ex-
amine whether further market access would 
be an option to help the development of the 
market” (Commission of the European Com-
munities, 2007a: 7).
Bioethanol is traded as either undenatured or 
denatured alcohol, with a most favoured nation 
(MFN) tariff rate of €19.2 or €10.2 per hectolitre, 
under heading 2207.10 or 2207.20. However, 
over the 3-year period 2002–04, 61 percent of 
ethanol imports (some of which were for bever-
age or industrial use) entered the EU duty free 
under three main schemes – super-GSP, Every-
thing but Arms, and the Cotonou Agreement for 
the ACP States – under no quantitative restric-
tions (Commission of the European Communi-
ties, 2006a: 26–7). The International Food and 
Agricultural Trade Policy Council, citing a report 
from the European Union of Ethanol Producers, 
suggests that Brazilian fuel ethanol had been 
imported into Sweden under HS 3824.90.99, 
with a 6.5 percent ad valorem duty, justified 
because of a higher level of denaturing (IPC and 
Renewable Energy and International Law, 2006: 
Endnote 30).
Bioethanol could be included in a new free-
trade area agreement with Mercosur (compris-
ing Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay). As 
the Commission (2006a: 14) notes: “Sugar and 
bioethanol are Brazil’s main offensive interests 
and are therefore essential elements of these 
negotiations.” The European Union of Ethanol 
Producers, in an Issues paper on its website, sug-
gests that the EU’s offer to Mercosur was for a 
tariff rate quota of 1 million tonnes of fuel oil, 
which it contrasted with the present market size 
of just 500 000 tonnes.30
Biodiesel faces an MFN import tariff of 6.5 per-
cent under Customs Code 3824.9099; but in 
February 2006, the Commission (2006a: 26) re-
ported that there was “no significant external 
trade, since the EU is by far the world’s biggest 
producer”. The European Biodiesel Board (EBB) 
subsequently complained of “dumping” by the 
USA, an issue that we discuss further below. An-
other relevant consideration is that product will 
be imported as vegetable oil rather than biodie-
sel. Crude palm oil, for example, for technical 
or non-food industrial use enters the EU free of 
import duty under Customs Code 1511.10; and 
crude soybean oil with a tariff of 3.2 percent.
As and when the Doha Round is concluded, tar-
iffs on bioethanol and agricultural raw materials 
would face reductions negotiated under the new 
Doha Agreement on Agriculture. The tariff head-
ing for biodiesel, however, is not included in the 
list of agricultural products in the existing Agree-
ment on Agriculture, giving it a rather uncertain 
status in the WTO (Motaal, 2008), and so any tar-
iff reductions would probably be as agreed in the 
non-agricultural market access negotiations.
5.1 Import tariffs on biofuels
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In Chapter 2 we reported USDA data on the 
quantities of biodiesel and bioethanol im-
ported into the EU. These data are repeated 
in Table 10.
In addition, some EU production of biodiesel is 
based on imported palm oil and soybeans (and 
soybean oil). The EU has for a long time been a 
major importer of soybeans for crushing within 
the EU, and at one time it was a net exporter 
of soybean oil. It is now a net importer (Table 
11). It may be recalled from Table 4 that the 
USDA’s estimate for the use of soybean oil in 
EU biodiesel production in 2006 was 800 000 
tonnes.
2006 2007 e 2008 e 2009 f 2010 f
Biodiesel 2.9 12.3 14.9 14.1 14.0
Bioethanol 17.0 37.4 37.7 39.1 35.0
table 10: eu-27 imports of biodiesel and bioethanol expressed as a percentage 
of the eu’s biodiesel and bioethanol markets
e, estimate; f, forecast.
Source: USDA, as reported in Tables 2.4 and 2.5.
The USDA’s estimate of imports of biodiesel 
into the EU, reported in Table 2.4, was 750 000 
tonnes in 2007 and 1 000 000 tonnes in 2008. 
The larger part of this would seem to have 
come from the USA. Indeed, the EBB (2008) has 
claimed that imports of B99 from the USA into 
the EU in 2007 amounted to 1.05 million tonnes 
of B99 (a rather larger number than the USDA’s) 
and that in the first seven months of 2008 B99 
imports amounted already to 850 000 tonnes.
The underpinning policy allegedly driving this 
trade is the US subsidy for blending bio- and 
mineral fuels, dating from 2004. UK policy, by 
contrast, subsidies the use of biofuels. The EBB 
(2008) had claimed that the US policy resulted 
in a subsidy of “up to” $264 per m3 (i.e. of 
$300 a tonne) by producing a biodiesel mix with 
only a “drop” of mineral diesel added (hence, 
B99).31 B99 was then exported to Europe, where 
it was eligible for European support schemes, 
undercutting (so the EBB claimed) European 
producers.
There were also suggestions that the US had 
imported vegetable oils that were subsequently 
exported as subsidized B99 (the so-called “splash 
and dash” trade). This issue was addressed 
by the US Congress in October 2008, when it 












99 156 166 228
From imported 
seed
2749 3062 2810 3010
Imports (extra-
EU)
18 190 600 1050
Exports (extra-
EU)
782 490 320 670
table 11: eu supplies of soybean oil (1000 tonnes)
Source: European Commission (2008a: Table 4.4.4.3).
5.3 B99 imports from the usA
5.2 trade volumes
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benefit the blending of products “produced 
outside the US for use as a fuel outside the 
US” (quoted by the EBB, 2008). However, the 
EBB claims that this will do little to stem the 
trade, as 90 percent of US biodiesel exports are 
derived from US product.
As a result, the EBB lodged a complaint with 
the Commission in April 2008, and the latter 
then initiated both anti-dumping and anti-
subsidy investigations against biodiesel from 
the USA (European Commission, 2008b). Fol-
lowing an investigation, the Commission con-
cluded that US “exports of dumped and sub-
sidised biodiesel were causing material injury 
to the biodiesel industry in the EU”, and ac-
cordingly in March 2009 it imposed temporary 
antidumping and anti-subsidy duties.32
The WTO agreements allow WTO Members to 
take trade remedies in clearly defined circum-
stances. The WTO Agreement on the Implemen-
tation of Article VI of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 1994 allows anti-dumping 
duties to be charged when foreign firms can 
be shown to be “dumping” their product in the 
import market and causing material injury to 
the firms in the import market. Furthermore, 
a countervailing duty can be imposed to offset 
any subsidy granted by the exporting country 
under Part V (“Countervailing Measures”) of the 
WTO SCM Agreement.
Economists usually favour the removal of trade 
barriers and other market distortions and argue 
for taxes on negative externalities and subsidies 
on positive externalities, because it is presumed 
that these measures move the global economy 
closer to a “perfect competition” optimum. But 
the dilemma that policymakers face is that the 
first-best world of perfect competition is not 
attainable: instead, we operate in a second-best 
world, and we have no guarantee that removal 
of one market imperfection will improve global 
economic welfare. This potential problem is 
particularly evident from our discussion of EU 
biofuel policy.
If the use of biofuels is encouraged in one 
jurisdiction, by tax rebates or mandates for 
example, and not in others, then there will 
be a commercial incentive to ship biofuels 
to the economy where they can benefit from 
these concessions. Thus, the EU’s policies are 
likely to encourage the import of biofuels that 
might have been utilized more efficiently in 
the country of production. This is a particular 
problem for developing countries that cannot 
afford the generous concessions offered by 
the EU, and they might end up importing 
fossil fuels so that they can export biofuel to 
the EU. Ideally, all countries should adopt the 
same incentives for bioenergy production (or, 
preferably, the same disincentives for fossil-
carbon emissions, such as a carbon tax), but 
as this utopia is unlikely to be realized the EU 
should give serious consideration to reducing 
its incentives for bioenergy, thus reducing the 
commercial gains of engaging in uneconomic 
(but commercially advantageous) trade.
The US policy of subsidizing the blending 
of biofuels can also result in economically 
unsustainable trade flows, as we saw in the 
preceding section.
The second trade policy dilemma is often 
remarked upon in the context of EU trade 
policy. By granting tariff concessions on the 
import of products from some countries, 
but not from others, in the context of GSP, 
economic partnership agreements (EPAs), etc., 
trade distortions are introduced into the global 
economy that the preference receiving nations 
are keen to see maintained. Preference erosion 
is a tricky issue in the ongoing Doha negotiations, 
but the appropriate policy response is to wean 
preference recipients off their dependence on 
protected markets by importing nations reducing 
their MFN tariffs. Such tariff reductions could 
be achieved by concluding the Doha Round.
5.4 two trade policy dilemmas
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There are three issues that we discuss in this 
chapter. First, how is EU support for biofuels to 
be treated in the WTO, if the UK’s schemes are 
at all typical? Second, are the EU’s proposals 
on biofuel sustainability compatible with WTO 
commitments? Third, we briefly discuss tech-
nical standards for biofuels and international 
standardization.
At the outset, it should be stressed that inter-
preting WTO provisions, and the interplay be-
tween various WTO agreements, is a complex 
endeavour. WTO Members, one can presume, 
strive to ensure that their policies conform to 
WTO commitments; but, if challenged, it is a 
Dispute Settlement Panel (with recourse to the 
Appellate Body) that must arbitrate. Although 
there is some element of a body of case law es-
tablishing precedents, each case is settled on the 
specific facts and circumstances that arise. Not 
all biofuel policies are the same: for example, 
in the UK there is a road fuel tax rebate and an 
RTFO, as we saw in Chapter 3, and in the US there 
has been a tax credit for the blending of biodiesel 
(see Chapter 5). These provisions will not neces-
sarily be regulated by the WTO in the same way. 
As yet, there is no direct WTO jurisprudence re-
garding biofuels, and the literature is sparse but 
growing; see, for example, IPC and Renewable 
Energy and International Law (2006) and Motaal 
(2008), and Charnovitz, Earley and Howse (2008) 
on proposed social sustainability criteria.
6. InteRACtIon wIth wto PRoVIsIons
Subsidies are subject to the SCM Agreement, 
except as provided for in the Agreement on Ag-
riculture, but both can apply in combination. 
As noted earlier, the latter’s Annex I lists the 
products subject to the Agreement, and that 
list does not include the headings under which 
biodiesel is traded today. Thus, it would appear 
that biodiesel (but not the vegetable oils and 
animal fats that go into biodiesel) is not cov-
ered by the Agreement on Agriculture.
Article 1 of the SCM Agreement defines a sub-
sidy. Essentially there has to be a cost to the 
government (e.g. “government revenue that is 
otherwise due is foregone or not collected”), or 
“there is any form of income or price support in 
the sense o Article XVI of GATT” and “a benefit 
is thereby conferred”. Presumably, if road fuel 
taxes on mineral oils were objectively imposed 
as carbon taxes, with non-fossil fuels exempt, 
then a WTO Member could argue that no subsidy 
was involved.33
The concept of specificity is important (Article 
2). It is only if a subsidy is specific (e.g. to an 
enterprise, industry or region) that the SCM dis-
ciplines apply.
Two forms of subsidy are simply prohibited: 
export subsidies and “subsidies contingent ... 
upon the use of domestic over imported goods”, 
except as provided for in the Agreement on Ag-
riculture. The EU’s biofuel policies as applied in 
the UK do not seem to be problematic on either 
score. Kutas, Lindberg and Steenblik (2007: 37) 
do nonetheless report that the fuel-tax abate-
ment in some Member States operates on a 
quota basis and that “The objectives of these 
systems are threefold: to limit the government 
revenue losses, to control the expansion of bio-
fuels production, and to exclude imports from 
outside the EU” (author’s italics). If operating 
in this way, such subsidies could fall foul of the 
SCM Agreement.
Other subsidies are either actionable (Part III 
of the SCM Agreement) or non-actionable (Part 
IV). Actionable subsidies are those that cause 
harm to the economic interests of producers in 
another WTO Member, and can lead to a WTO 
dispute or a Member invoking the countervail-
ing measures to offset the effect of the subsidy 
(as the EU has done against the USA over im-
ports of biodiesel), or both.
For a WTO complaint to be upheld, a complain-
ant would have to demonstrate the harm, show-
ing cause and effect, and it is not entirely clear 
what case could be mounted against the EU’s 
biofuel policies. The harm that is referred to in 
6.1 subsidies
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Part III of the SCM Agreement relates to “injury 
to the domestic industry of another Member”, 
“nullification of impairment” of tariff conces-
sions or “serious prejudice” such as displace-
ment of imports or price undercutting, none 
of which seems to apply to the EU’s schemes 
(certainly as applied in the UK). The usual com-
plaint about the EU’s (and others’) biofuel poli-
cies is that they increase world food commodity 
prices, which is not an issue addressed by the 
SCM Agreement.
However, there are by-products of the biofuel 
industry. Oilseed rape, when crushed, produces 
not only oil that can be used for biodiesel but 
also a protein-rich meal used as animal feed. 
Thus, the biofuel programme might be seen 
to increase the domestic crushing industry’s 
market share in oilseed meals, and the net 
effect of the programme could be a reduction 
in the price of oilseed meal. Conceivably, this 
could lead to a charge that it results in “injury 
to the domestic industry of another Member”, 
but it would be difficult to make the case.
The Agreement on Agriculture
The language of the Agreement on Agriculture 
is rather different from that used in the SCM 
Agreement. Instead of “subsidy”, it uses the 
term “domestic support”. In particular, Article 
6 (headed “Domestic Support Commitments”) 
says: “The domestic support reduction commit-
ments of each Member ... shall apply to all of its 
domestic support measures in favour of agricul-
tural producers with the exception of domestic 
measures which are not subject to reduction in 
terms of the criteria set out in this Article and 
in Annex 2 ...” (author’s italics – these words 
are potentially important in interpreting the 
Agreement).
For the purposes of this paper, there are two 
broad categories of support, commonly referred 
to as the amber and green boxes. Amber box 
support is constrained, by a total AMS, while the 
green box (Annex 2 to the Agreement) outlines the 
circumstances under which policies are exempt 
from limits to the level of support. For example, 
they must meet the “fundamental requirement” 
that they have “no, or at least minimal, trade-
distorting effects or effects on production” 
(Swinbank, forthcoming). Although the current 
amber box limits are not a binding constraint on 
the CAP, these constraints will be considerably 
tightened by any likely Doha Agreement and 
become binding (Swinbank, 2008).
Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture ex-
plains how the total AMS should be calculated. 
Simplifying considerably, it consists of two ba-
sic parts: first an AMS should be “calculated 
on a product-specific basis for each basic ag-
ricultural product receiving market price sup-
port”; second, any “non-exempt direct pay-
ment, or any other subsidy not exempted from 
the reduction commitment” should be included 
(Paragraph 1; author’s italics). Non-exempt 
direct payments (or subsidies) may be either 
product-specific or non-product-specific. Subsi-
dies include “both budgetary outlays and rev-
enue foregone by governments or their agents” 
(Paragraph 2), and market price support is “cal-
culated using the gap between a fixed external 
reference price and the applied administered 
price multiplied by the quantity of production 
eligible to receive the applied administered 
price” (Paragraph 8). Furthermore, Paragraph 
7 specifies that “Measures directed at agricul-
tural processors shall be included to the extent 
that such measures benefit the producers of the 
basic agricultural products.”
So, how will the EU declare its biofuel policies 
in the WTO? On-farm investment grants to plant 
Miscanthus or to build anaerobic digesters 
for biogas production, for example, will 
doubtless be declared as green box polices. 
(These policies often support bioenergy 
production more generally rather than biofuels 
specifically.) For example, for 2005–06, under 
Paragraph 11 of Annex 2 (which has the heading 
“Structural adjustment assistance provided 
through investment grants”), the EU declared 
expenditure of €7.3 billion on measures 
including “Construction of processing, packaging 
and storage centres and equipment; land 
improvement (levelling, fencing, etc.); aid for 
farm modernization granted through subsidies 
or equivalent interest concessions; purchase of 
machinery and equipment, animals, buildings 
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and plantations;” etc. (WTO, 2009: Supporting 
Table DS:1).
The Energy Crops Scheme, described in Chapter 
4, has been declared blue box support: the 
blue box is a category between the green 
and amber boxes of direct payments “under 
production-limiting programmes” based on 
“fixed area and yields” and under the current 
Agreement on Agriculture is not subject to 
expenditure constraints. However, the Energy 
Crops Scheme has been abolished by the 2008 
“Health Check” reform (see Chapter 4), and 
in any event expenditures are too small to 
seriously compromise the EU’s ability to abide 
by its commitments in the current Agreement 
on Agriculture.
The UK’s biofuel policies do not appear to grant 
market price support within the meaning of An-
nex 3. There is no “applied administered price” 
and no systematic mechanism to support mar-
ket prices, although it must be conceded that 
biofuel policies will tend to increase the farm-
gate price of biofuel ingredients.
Should these policies be included in the AMS 
as non-exempt direct payments or any other 
subsidy? The UK’s Fuel Tax rebate, for example, 
does involve revenue foregone by government; 
but the consumer subsidy implicit in the UK’s 
RTFO would not appear to be so covered. As 
noted earlier, Paragraph 7 of Annex 3 does 
say that “Measures directed at agricultural 
processors should be included to the extent 
that such measures benefit the producers of the 
basic agricultural products” (author’s italics). 
But how is this latter phrase to be interpreted? 
At the very least, it would presumably exclude 
subsidies paid on imported products; and 
arguably it would cover not the full subsidy 
but only that part of the subsidy that benefited 
producers, and this would require some 
economic test. There is the further complication 
that biodiesel is not a product covered by the 
Agreement on Agriculture, and so it could be 
argued that if biofuels are to be included, then 
the AMS should relate only to bioethanol and 
not to biodiesel.
It might be expected that the EU would 
resist including its biofuel subsidies in its AMS 
calculations, advancing arguments as outlined 
in the previous paragraph, and if forced to do so 
would declare only a portion of the government 
expenditure (or revenues foregone), reflecting 
the presumed gain to farmers, on crops grown 
in the EU for ethanol production.
But what if all of the taxpayer and consumer cost 
of EU biofuel policy were declared as amber box? 
In Table 12 we attempt a very rough estimate of 
the magnitude of the potential amber box “cost” 
of the EU’s biofuel policies, should the EU need to 
declare them as such, based upon support levels 
in the UK. The European Petroleum Industry 
Association (2007: 53), based on Eurostat data, 
suggests that in 2005 “motor fuel demand” for 
the EU27 amounted to 180 million tonnes of diesel 
and just short of 110 million tonnes of petrol. The 
budget/taxpayer cost of using biofuels was set at 
20 pence litre (the existing road fuel tax rebate 
in the UK); in addition, the consumer cost was 
recorded at 10 pence per litre (less than the RTFO 
buy-out price, but reflecting the going market rate 
in November 2008). A 10 percent incorporation 
rate was assumed, and an exchange rate of €1 = 
£1. The final figure represents over 16 percent of 
the EU15’s current AMS limit. This would seriously 
impair the EU’s ability to abide by the domestic 
subsidy constraints of any likely Doha outcome.
6.2 sustainability criteria
Although the EU’s support policies for biofuels 
do not seem to raise any particular problems 
with respect to WTO disciplines, the same can-
not necessarily be said of its attempt to make 
that support conditional upon environmental 
sustainability criteria in the production of bio-
fuels, or even more the European Parliament’s 
attempt to extend this to socioeconomic cri-
teria such as labour standards. To recap from 
Chapter 2, in order for biofuels to benefit from 
financial support or count towards targets, they 
should demonstrate greenhouse gas emission 
savings of at least 35 percent, and the Euro-
pean Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Re-
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search and Energy had suggested that this fig-
ure should have been 45 percent.
This emphasis on process rather than product 
standards is redolent of other challenges that 
the WTO system has faced over the years relat-
ing to process standards (Swinbank, 2006). The 
WTO has been very reluctant to admit that ethi-
cal or other concerns about how a product was 
made are at all relevant if there is no physical 
manifestation of this in the final product.
The problem starts with General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article III on “National 
Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regula-
tion”. Basically, the requirement is that im-
ported products should be “accorded treatment 
no less favourable than that accorded to like 
products of national origin in respect of all laws 
and requirements affecting their internal sale, 
offering for sale, purchase, transport, distribu-
tion or use”. Article I, outlining MFN treatment, 
basically says that there should be no differ-
entiation between origins. A crucial question, 
then, is what is a like product? Here, the WTO 
has no firm definition: each case is judged on 
its merits (for a discussion, see Read (2005) and 
Charnovitz, Earley and Howse (2008): 10–11).
It would be extremely difficult, however, to 
claim that a biofuel that showed a greenhouse 
gas emission saving of 34 percent (and so did not 
qualify for support) was not a like product with 
a biofuel that showed a saving of 35 percent 
(and so did qualify for support).34 Unless there 
are some objective criteria that lie behind the 
figure of 35 percent, it looks to be quite an ar-
bitrary number, which cannot be used readily 
to differentiate between products. If the Euro-
pean Parliament’s view had prevailed, that 45 
percent was the appropriate benchmark, then 
importers could legitimately have asked why 
45 percent was the “correct” number rather 
than the 35 percent that had originally been 
proposed by the Commission. The inclusion of 
socioeconomic criteria, as advocated by the Eu-
ropean Parliament’s industry committee, would 
have been even more problematic.
Thus, the EU’s proposed environmental sus-
tainability criteria are likely to fall foul of the 
National Treatment provisions for like products 
enshrined in GATT Article III. The EU would then 
need to find some other WTO provision that 
would, nonetheless, enable it to apply its sus-
tainability criteria to imported product. Prece-
dent suggests that it would look to GATT Article 
XX, headed “General Exceptions”. In particu-
lar, and subject to the overarching provisions 
of its Chapeau, this article says that “nothing 
in this [GATT] Agreement shall be construed 
to prevent the adoption or enforcement ... of 
measures: ... (g) relating to the conservation of 







EU-27’s use of diesel 
and petrol, 2005
180 million tonnes of diesel at 0.85 kg/l
110 million tonnes of petrol at 0.72 kg/l
= 364 542 million litres
Cost for 10 percent 
biofuel inclusion




Expressed as  
percent of the AMS 
limit, at €1 = £1
16.3 percent
table 12: Potential amber box “cost” of the eu’s biofuel policies, based on uk data
AMS, aggregate measurement of support; RTFO, Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation.
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are made effective in conjunction with restric-
tions on domestic production or consumption”.
The overarching provisions are important: the 
measure must not be “applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifi-
able discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restric-
tion on international trade”. Although the EU will 
doubtless strive to ensure that this condition is 
met, drafting national legislation to be in confor-
mity with these provisions is not a trivial matter.
The language of Sub-paragraph (g), referring 
to “the conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources”, predates concerns about global warm-
ing and carbon dioxide emissions, but the WTO’s 
dispute settlement system might accept them as 
legitimate concerns. But a dispute settlement 
panel would probably want to be convinced by 
the science behind the measures (and again the 
arbitrary nature of 35 percent might be a prob-
lem) and, following the Appellate Body’s inter-
vention in the Shrimp–Turtle case, the EU would 
need to show that it had engaged in meaningful 
negotiations with its main suppliers in order to 
determine credible environmental sustainability 
criteria.35
However, there is little, if any, succour in GATT 
Article XX to allow the EU to apply socioeconom-
ic criteria in determining eligibility for biofuel 
subsidies or support (for a thorough discussion, 
see Charnovitz, Earley and Howse (2008)).
Vehicle engine design and warranties, climatic 
factors and fuel distribution systems, and ex-
isting technical standards for mineral-oil-based 
transport fuels inevitably mean that there have 
to be technical standards for biofuels. Differ-
ences in technical standards can lead to non-
trade barriers, and in the WTO legal system 
these are regulated by the Agreement on Tech-
nical Barriers to Trade.
Although not wishing to belittle the potential im-
portance of technical standards as an impediment 
to world trade (we note, for example, the com-
ment in the report prepared by the IPC and Re-
newable Energy and International Law (2006) that 
“The EU biodiesel standard, while not premised on 
the use of rapeseed oil, might as well be premised 
on it”), the issues are more generic in character 
and are not discussed further in this report.
Suffice it to note that the EU is one of the par-
ticipants in the Tripartite Task Force (compris-
ing Brazil, the EU and the USA) that, in Decem-
ber 2007, produced a detailed White Paper on 
Internationally Compatible Biofuel Standards 
(Tripartite Task Force, 2007).
6.3 technical standards
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It should be recalled that this report did not 
set out to assess the science and technology, or 
the economics, underpinning the EU’s policy on 
biofuels. Instead, its objective was to describe 
the EU’s biofuel policies, set in the context 
of its overall policy framework on renewables 
and bioenergy, and their interface with the 
WTO legal system. As a factual report, it draws 
relatively few conclusions and makes few 
recommendations.
When governments intervene in markets, they 
face the risk of generating yet more market 
distortions. Thus, if some jurisdictions, such 
as the EU, give financial incentives to use 
biofuels, for example the road fuel tax rebate 
and the RTFO in the UK, and others do not, they 
risk generating trade flows that are motivated 
largely to take advantage of those discrepancies. 
Consequently, the EU’s imports of biofuels (and 
of vegetable oils for the production of biofuels) 
are likely to be larger than they would otherwise 
be. The preferable, but politically unlikely, 
mechanism to address this problem would 
be for all governments to adopt the same (or 
broadly similar) policies towards biofuels, thus 
neutralizing any artificial financial advantage 
stemming from different policy regimes; but as 
this is an unlikely outcome in the near term, the 
EU should give due consideration to reducing 
the financial incentive. It is in any event likely 
that bioethanol and vegetable oils for biodiesel, 
produced in sunnier parts of the globe, would 
have a comparative advantage over competing 
products produced in the EU.
Tariff preferences also generate distortions 
in trade flows, as they favour some country 
suppliers over others; but this is a generic 
trade policy issue rather than one limited to 
biofuels. Economists would tend to argue that 
the appropriate policy response is to reduce 
the MFN tariff to zero, thereby removing the 
tariff preference although imposing adjustment 
costs on countries losing preferential access. 
If the EU is seriously committed to its biofuel 
policies, then it should give due consideration 
to the elimination of all tariffs on biofuels in 
the global Doha Round package, perhaps in 
the context of a zero-for-zero deal (it is of 
course free to unilaterally reduce its tariffs at 
any time). If there is no successful outcome to 
the Doha Round, then Brazil is likely to press 
for a zero-for-zero deal in the proposed free 
trade agreement between the EU and Mercosur, 
further marginalizing potential suppliers that 
do not have preferential access to the EU’s 
market.
The EU’s policies to encourage the use of 
biofuels, certainly as implemented in the UK, do 
not appear to raise problems in the context of 
the WTO’s SCM Agreement. They do not appear 
to be prohibited subsidies, as they do not favour 
domestic over imported biofuels, and they are 
not paid on export but only on domestic use. 
Nor would they seem to be actionable: they 
do not reduce market opportunities for non-EU 
suppliers. Instead, the complaint is that they 
tend to increase global food commodity prices, 
to the detriment of consumers, but this is not a 
concern addressed by the SCM Agreement.
It is doubtful that the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture imposes important constraints on 
the level of support afforded biofuels in the EU, 
certainly as implemented in the UK. It would 
appear that biodiesel is not an agricultural 
product covered by the Agreement, and so the 
costs of the policy attributable to biodiesel are 
arguably outside the remit of the amber box. 
The UK’s policies do not confer “market price 
support”, as defined for the amber box, but 
they could be construed as non-exempt direct 
payments to agricultural processors that do 
confer some benefit on the producers of the 
basic agricultural product. The EU will probably 
argue that no amber box support is involved; 
but failing that, it might concede that taxpayer 
(but not consumer) costs associated with 
the domestic production (but not imported) 
component of its bioethanol (but not biodiesel) 
programme could be included in its amber box, 
reflecting the level of support passed back to 
7. ConCLusIons AnD ReCoMMenDAtIons
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agricultural producers (which would not be easy 
to determine). If the full taxpayer and consumer 
cost of both bioethanol and biodiesel programmes 
on imported and domestically produced fuel 
were included, then initial calculations suggest 
that this could be a sizeable portion of the EU’s 
current AMS limit, which would perhaps be 
unsustainable following a successful conclusion 
to the Doha Round.
The main problem the EU faces with respect 
to the WTO is over its proposed environmental 
sustainability criteria for biofuels. It will be very 
difficult to argue that biofuels with a carbon 
emission saving of 34 percent are different 
(i.e. not like products) from those with a 35 
percent saving, for example, and thus the 
National Treatment criterion of GATT Article III 
would probably be breached. GATT Article XX, 
on General Exceptions, may offer a way out, 
but a WTO-compatible set of environmental 
sustainability criteria would not be easy to 
craft. At the very least, the package would have 
to be non-discriminatory, scientifically based, 
and implemented only after serious negotiations 
with potential suppliers.
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1. http://www.neurope.eu/view_news.php?id=83631. Accessed 3 November 2008.
2. It is usually said that conventional petrol engines can run on a mix containing up to 10 percent 
bioethanol and 90 percent petrol; this would be known as E10. Flexi-fuel vehicles run on a mixture 
of 85 percent bioethanol and 15 percent petrol (E85). Using similar terminology, a mix of 5 percent 
biodiesel and 95 percent mineral diesel would be denoted as B5, while a pure biodiesel fuel would 
be B100.
3. This involves heating the biomass with virtually no oxygen present. Similar processes produce 
different extractions: for example, gasification of biomass, producing a mixture of carbon monoxide 
and hydrogen-synthesis gas (syngas), reminiscent of the centuries-old charcoal technology.
4. Biogas would typically consist of 55–70 percent methane (CH4) and 45–30 percent carbon dioxide 
(CO2), in contrast to natural gas, which typically is 90 percent methane. To be used as a fuel in a 
combustion engine, most of the CO2 must be removed first.
5. Kutas, Lindberg and Steenblik (2007) produced a useful overview of EU policy on biofuels as of 
mid-2007, with a detailed inventory of the policies then in place in the Member States.
6. Article 3 states that “Member States should ensure that a minimum proportion of biofuels and 
other renewable fuels is placed on their markets, and, to that effect, shall set national indicative 
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